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.ACHES OF PLATO.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

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THE LACHES OE PLATO

INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION

AND

NOTES

BY THE

REV. A. LLOYD, M. Α.,

HEAD MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE SCHOOL,

PORT HOPE, Ο NT.,

FORMERL V FELLOW OF ST. PETER'S COLLEGE,

CAMBRIDGE.

PORT HOPE:

W. WILLIAMSON, BOOKSELLER.
189I.

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INTRODUCTION.

The Laches, which is one of the earliest of the works of
Plato is a dialogue on manliness.

The scene of the dialogue is laid at Athens towards the
end of the Peloponnesian War.

Two Athenians of good position, Lysimachus and Melesias,
have engaged a fencing-master, one Stesileus, to teach their
sons, and are returning from one of Stesileus' professional
exhibitions of skill, along with Nicias and Laches. On their
way home, as they are discussing the question of education,
they meet with Socrates, who is brought into the conversation,
Avhich eventually turns not on education but upon one of
the greatest ends to be obtained by education — manliness.

In choosing the personages who speak in his dialogues,
Plato was not guided by tacts — he was reporting imaginary
conversations, not actual ones — but by the poetical needs of
his subject.

In this dialogue, the subject of which is andria or andreia
— manliness, bravery, or courage — he chooses as personae
dramatis Socrates, Laches, Nicias, Lysimachus and Melesias.

Socrates, is represented as the type of courage, the teacher
and example /ar excellence of the highest form of manliness,
whose brave deeds have more than once brought credit to
the Athenian arms, and who is therefore more fitted than
any one else to become the teacher of the particular virtue
which he himself so excellently practises.

Socrates himself was the beau ideal of courage.

His simple, self-denying life showed that he had that

II. INTRODUCTION.

courage Avhich springs from self-conquest and which manifests
itself in self-control. His personal bravery has been amply
proved at Potidaea and Delium ; his political courage when
after the battle of Arginusaehe resisted an unjust vote of the
incensed people. His refusal to acquiesce in the acquirement
of half a truth, and hir habit of never resting till he had
tracked an error to its saurce, demonstrated beyond a doubt
his intellectual courage : — whilst his death set the seal to his
virtue and placed his courage out of the reath of detraction
and obloquy.

The characters chosen to converse with Socrates are them-
selves men of reputation for courage and bravery, and this
fact itself serves more clearly to bring into prominence the
idea of Socrates as a model of ideal courage. This will be
shown more clearly by considering the character of
. laches, the son of Melanopus. He is first mentioned by
Thucydides (ΠΙ 86) as taking command of the first exped-
ition to Sicily, in B. C. 427. In this expedition he
distinguished himself very highly for his well-planned and
equally well executed descents upon Sicily and Southern
Italy, but the whole expedition, failed owing to its numbers
being inadequate for the task it had undertaken.

After the failure of this expedition he was not entrusted
with a command for some time, but Plato tells us that he
fought as a private soldier at the battle of Delium, where he
aided Socrates in trying to stem the panic of the Athenian
troops.

In B. C. 423 he was one of the politicians who voted for
the armistice, and in B. C. 421 he was one of the Athenian
Commissioners who signed the treaty of peace and alliance
with the Lacadiemonians.

In B. C. 418 he \vas joined with Nicostratus in the
command of the Athenian contingent at the battle of
Mantinea, and there met his death.

(Thuc. Ill, 86, 90, 99, 103, 115. λ', 19, 24, 6i, 74.)
. Nicias the son of Nikeratos is known to us through the
history of Thucydides, and also through Plutarch's biography.
One of the richest men in Athens, noted for his beneficence
and public spirit, as well as for his probity and modesty, he

INTRODUCTION. iii.

was early singled out for public oiifices which for the most
part he filled with dignity.

Thucydides first mentioned him as in command of a party
which successfully attacked and captured the island of Minoa
off the Megarian harbour of Nisaea. He was not so success-
ful in his attack upon Melos, but afterwards invaded and
and devasted portions of Boeotia and Locris.

Chosen as commander of the expedition to Sphacteria, he
allowed himself to be superseded by Cleon who by sheer
audacity succeeded in his boestful undertaking. This does
not however seem to have lowered him in the estimation of
his compatriots, for we find him during the same summer
in command of an expedition against the sea-coasts of
Corinth and Argos.

In connection with this expedition Plutarch relates a very
characteristic episode. Nicias and his men had had a
successful encounter with a Corinthian force whose leader
they had killed. After the Athenians had erected the trophy
of victory customary in such cases, they saw that large
reinforcements were coming to the enemy from Corinth, and
deemed it prudent to retire. Just as they were on the point
of embarking Nicias' attention was called to the fact
that two of the Athenian dead lay unburied. Rather than
neglect this duty Nicias determined to forego his claim to
the victory and, sending a flag of truce, demanded permission
from the Corinthians to bury his dead soldiers.

After some further successful landings on Lacedaemonian
territory. Nicias was one of the strategi who in B. C. 423,
signed the armistice, and was one of the commissioners
who drew up the treaty of peace and alliance with Sparta.
This treaty proved abortive, and Nicias was sent to conduct
military operations in Thrace, but after the death of Brasidas
and Cleon he became one of the leaders of the Athenian
peace party.

Alcibiades, who was always jealous of the influence which
Nicias exercised over his fellow-countrymen, now proposed
an expedition against Syracuse. Nicias strenuously opposed
the proposal, but in vain, and along with Alcibiades and
Lamachus was sent out to Sicily in command of that ill-fated

IV. INTRODUCTION.

expedition which was to the Athenian Empire what the
invasion of Russia was to Napoleon. Alcibiades was re-
called, Lamachus soon was killed, and Nicias alone— doing
his duty in spite of his better judgment — failed to reduce
Syracuse, and at last in the destruction of his fleet and army
met his own death.

He has been accused of vacillation and a want of daring
in the conduct of the siege. How little such a charge was
really deserved may be gathered from the fact that Thucydides
the historian of the siege of Syracuse describes him as the
man who on account of the completness of his " equipment
for virtue " least merited to meet with misfortune ; that
though the hasty judgment of his fellow-countrymen omit-
ted his name from the commemorative pillar erected in
memory of those who fell in Sicily, yet Demosthenes in the
next generation, classed him with Aristides and Pericles as
one of the great men of Athens, and that Plutarch selects
him as one whose biography it was profitable to compose.

The two characters here described — Laches, who when
deprived of his oiiiicer's commission was willing to serve his
country as a common soldier, and Nicias who chose rather
to face ignonimious defeat than be untrue to himself and
who remained faithful to his country's service even when his
own opinions were contemptuously set aside for those of
younger and inferior men, — may serve as an apt illustration
of Plato's ideas on bravery.

This may be further illustrated from

4. Lysimachus, the son of Aristides, and

5. Afelesias, the son of Thucydides, (not the historian, but
the politician who succeeded Pericles as a party leader but
was afterwards ostracised).

In both these cases the bravery of the fathers had not
descended to the sons, and it is the shame felt by the fathers
at having no deeds of their own to boast about that leads up
to the dialogue composed by Plato.

Courage then, or manliness, is according to Plato that
faculty or power by which a man is enabled to do his duty
at all times and in all places and never to fail from virtue.
It is not however hereditary but depends upon a proper

INTRODUCTION. v.

apprehension of right and wrong, of punishments and rewards.

The student will look in vain for this definition of courage
in the pages of the Laches. It is contrary to Plato's method
to come to any definite conclusion. His object was to elicit
thought, but not to stereotype it, and consequently he shrinks
as a rule from giving any definitions, though he is perpetually
seeking for them.

" To stimulate intelligence, to rouse the mind to seek for
clear definitions of familiar notions, especially those which
are at once most familiar and most indefinite, namely, our
moral ideas " was the object of Socrates, who well describes
himself as an intellectual midwife, aiding others to conceive
and bring forth ideas, but never producing one himself
Plato reproduces this ever-present spirit of enquiry in all his
writings, and on finishing any one of his dialogues we
generally have a feeling that many ideas have been started,
none of which is perfectly satisfactory, and that after showing
us the subject in every conceivable light, he leaves us to
form our own conclusions.

I append an extract from Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics
Bk. Ill, which may afford the reader a useful comparison.

Now that courage is a mean state on the subjects and of
fear and confidence has been already made apparent : but
it is evident that we fear things terrible ; and these are to
speak generally, evils ; and therefore people define fear " the
expectation of evil." Νολυ we fear all evils, as disgrace,
poverty, disease, friendlessness, and death. But the brave
man does not appear to have to do with all evils ; for some
it is right and good to fear, and not to fear them is disgraceful,
as, for example, not to fear disgrace ; for he who fears this
is a worthy and honest man, and he who does not fear
it is shamelefss. But by some people he is called brave,
metaphorically ; for he bears some resemblance to the brave
man ; for the brave man too is fearless. But poverty,
perhaps, and disease, and all those things ^vhich do not
happen from vice, or our own fault, it is not right to fear ;
but yet the man who is fearless in these things is not brave.
But him, too, we call so, from the resemblance ; for some

VI. INTRODUCTION.

who in war are cowards, are liberal, and behave with courage
under pecuniary losses. Nor yet is a man a coward if he is
afraid of insult to his children and wife, or of envy, or any-
thing of this kind, nor is he brave if he feels confidence
when about to be scourged.

What sort of fearful things, then, has the courageous man
to do with ; the greatest ? for no man is more able than he
to undergo terrible things ; but death is the most terrible of
all things ; for it is a limit; and it is thought that to the dead
there is nothing beyond, either good or bad. And yet the
brave man does not appear to have to do with death in
every form ; as at sea and in disease. With what kinds of
death, then ? Is it with the most honourable ? But those
that occur in war are of this kind, for in war the danger is the
greatest and most honourable. The public honours that are
awarded in states and by monarchs attest this.

Properly, then, he \vho in the case of an honorable death,
and under circumstances close at hand which cause death,
is fearless, may be called courageous ; and the dangers of
war are, more than any others, of this descripton. Not but
that the brave man is fearless at sea, and in sickness ; but
not from the same cause as seamen ; for the brave give up
all hope of safety, and are grieved at such a kind of death ;
but seamen are sanguine, because of their experience.
Moreover, brave men show manliness in cases where there
is room tor exerting themselves, and in which death is
honourable; but in such deaths as the above-mentioned there
is neither one of these conditions nor the other.

PLATONIS LACHES,

I. Lysimachiis. — You have indeed seen the man fighting in
armour, Nicias and Laches; but why we, that is Melesias here
and I, invited you to come and join us in the spectacle, we
did not tell you at the time, but we will tell you now; for we
think that we ought to be open with you. There are some
people, yori know^, who laugh at such things, and if one asks
their advice-they will not say what they think, but make a
/gitess at their iMifuJ^f^'^wa say something different to
what they really think. But as for you, we thought that you
were capable of forming an opinion, and that having formed
an opinion you would tell us what you thought in a straight-
forward manner. We have therefore invited you to give us
your advice in the matter which we are going tcK^hfriiifnicate
to you.

Now this is the point about which I have made so long a
preamble. We have got sons; this boy here belongs to
Melesias, and bears his grandfather's name of Thucydides;
this one here again is mine, and has the same name as his
grandfather and my father — for we call him Aristldes. Now
we have determined to take the best care possible of these .
children, and not do as most people do, when they grow into
lads to allow them to do what they please. But we have
determined to begin at once to care for them to the best of
our abilities.

Now we knew that you had sons too, and we thought that
you would be more likely than anyone else to have taken
thought for their training and development. And if it should
happen that you have not paid much attention to this
subject, (we hoped) to remind you not to neglect it, and to
stir you up to make some provision for your sons along with
ourselves.

1. you know. — ^The English colloquial "you know" is very often the

best equivalent to the Greek gar, and I have so translated it
here and elsewhere.

2. make a guess at their constdter. — i.e. try to find out what

will please him.

II. Now, though it is somewhat of a long story, Nicias and
Laches, you must please let me tell yoa,-heTv- we came to
this determination. Well, you must know that Melesias
here and I have onr meals together, and that our children
dine with us. As I said then at the beginning of my speech
we will be free with you. For each one of us has many
excellent things to tell to the youngsters about his father —
of their actions in war and in peace, and how they managed
the affairs of the allies and of the city. But neither of us
can talk of his own actions. We therefore feel somewhat
ashamed of ourselves before these boys, and we blame our
fathers for allowing us to be idle Avhen we began to grow up,
and devoting their time to other people's affairs. And we
point this out to these youngsters here and tell them that if
they neglect themselves and do not follow our advice they
λυΙΙΙ never become famous, whereas if they will take the
trouble they λνΙΠ assuredly become worthy of the names they

^^ bear.

^.r'^.v'' The boys now say that they are going to follow our ad-

V -. ' vice, and so we are trying to discover what study or practice

1*^- ^ will profit them the most. Well then, someone told us that

j<r* -r^ ^^ ^^'^^ ^ good thing for a young man to learn fighting in arm-

^Λχ.^\ our, and he kept praising this fellow whose exhibition of skill

you have been watching, and teUing us to see him for

ourselves. So we determined that we ought ourselves to go

and see the man, and to take you \vith us, partly for the

pleasure of your company at the exhibition, and partly

as advisers and helpers if you so wished, in our care for our

boys. This is what we Avanted to tell you. It is your turn

now to give us your advice with regard not only to this

study, whether you think we should pursue it or not, but

with regard to other studies as well, if you have any study

or pursuit to recommend to a young man, and to tell us what

you will do (in the matter of helping ίι§.) '/ '' Γ *

III. Nicias. — For my own part, Lysimachus and Melesias, I

approve of your design and am ready to aid you in it; and

I think that Laches here is of the same mind.

Laches. — You are right, Nicias; I think that what
Lysimachus said just now about his own father and Meles-
ias, was a true remark not only as regards them but with re-

spect to ourselves and all that concern themselves with public
affairs. It generally happens as he said that both their
children and their other private concerns are made little of and
negligently se^5sKie. So far you say rightly, Lysimachus,
but 1 am surprised that you should invite us as advisers in
the education of the young men, and should pass over
Socrates yonder, who in the first place belongs to your
deme, and in the second place is always found haunting every
place in which any noble study or practice, such as you seek
for the young, is going on.

Lysimachus. — What do you say Laches? Do you mean
that Socrates here has ever paid any attention to such topics.

Laches. — Most certainly, Lysimaches.

Nicias. — Why even I could tell you as much about this as
Laches can. For Socrates lately procured me a music
teacher for my son, Damon, a pupil of Agathocles, a most
accomplished man, not only in music but in every way that
you can think a most desirable companion for young men of
that age.
IV. Lysimachus. — Old men like myself, Socrates, Nicias and
Laches, are no longer in touch with our juniors in-as-
much as our age compels us to be much in-doors; but if you,
oh son of Sophroniscus, have any good advice to give to your
fellow townsman here, I hope you will give it. Indeed it is^'< **'*^
right that you should do so, for you are an old frien d of
ours inasmuch as your father and I were companions and
friends, and we never had a difference of opinion until the
day of his death. And now I remember to have heard them
talking. For these boys here when conversing at home fre-
quently make mention of Socrates and praise him very highly.
Yet I never yet asked them whether they meant the son of
Sophroniscus. Tell me, boys, is this the Socrates you are
always talking about ?

Boys. — Yes, to be sure, father, this is he.

Lysimachus. — By Hera, Socrates, I am glad that you are
a credit to your father'^ who was in every way a most excellent

I. a credit to your father. — or perhaps "maintain the name of your
father", with a play upon the name Sophroniscus, which is
connected with sopkron "wise".

man — especially as you and I shall now be intimate and
familiar friends.

Lac/ies. — Well, Lysimachus, you must not let him ofif.
For I have seen him elsewhere too doing credit not only to
his father but also to his country. You know, he was
marching with me in the retreat from Delium, and I can
tell you that if others had been like him, our city would
be prosperous and would not then have met with such a
reverse.

Lysiivachiis. — This is a great compliment, Socrates, that has
been paid you by men who are Avorthy of credit, in those very
matters about which they praise you. You may be qtcite sure
that I was delighted to hear you well spoken of, for you
must know that I am one of your most sincere well wishers.
Indeed I think that you should have been the first to call upon
us and to treat us as your familiar friends (as we are).
However from to-day, since we have made one another's
acquaintance, I hope you will certainly associate with us and
get to know us and these youngsters here, so that you may
keep our friendship. Now I am sure that you will do this
and I shall remind you to do so once and again.

But to return to our subject, what do you say of it? What
do you think? Is it a suitable study for lads or not — ^to learn
fencing ?
V. Socrates. — Well, Lysimachus, I will try to give you any
advice I can in this matter, and also to act upon your kind
invitation. But it seems to me that the right way is for me
who am younger than these men here and less experienced
to hear what they have to say first and to learn from them;
and afterwards if I have any objections or additions to
make to what they have said, I can then state my case and per-
suade you and these men also.
. Now, Nicias, why don't you speak first? Λ ^

■^^, ;, *' Nicias. — There is nothing to prevent me Socrates. I think, (//'
^.f ^ ,^a/' you know, that this is a most useful study for young men in
<,»■ ^\ many ways. For their not spending their time elsewhere, I
mean in those places where young men are apt to lounge
when they have leisure is an advantage ; for here they have
bodily improvement — , you know, it is quite as hard and
laborious a place as any gymnasium ; and at the same time

this exercise and riding are the most suitable exercises for a
gentlemen. For the sports which we practise and the places
in which we practise them are patronized only by those who
make use of these as their instruments of warfare. Further,
this study will be of some advantage in the battle itself,
when one has to fight in the ranks along with many
others. But its greatest advantage is when the ranks have
been broken and one comes to single combat either as a
pursuer attacking some one on his defence, or as a fugitive
defending oneself against the attack of some other assailant.
In such a case the man who understands this art would
certainly have nothing to fear from a single assailant, possibly
not even from several, but vvould get the better of them in
every way by this art.

Again, an art of this sort promptes the desire for another
noble study For every one that has learned sword-exer-
cise would naturally wish to acquire the next thing — i. e.
company drill^and when he has acquired this in a creditable
manner, he will- probably wish to study the whole science
of military tactics. Now it is abundantly clear that all the
studies and practices connected with these sciences are
honorable and quite worthy of a man's study and practice —
and to them this art (that we are speaking of) would form
an introduction.

And to this we will add what is no small recommendation —
namely, that it would greatly increase every man's bravery
and manliness in war. And let us not be ashamed to say,
though perhaps it may seem to some a small matter, that it
will add to a man's carriage in the circumstances under which
a man's carriage is of importance to him, when, that is, his
carriage will make him appear more formidable to his
enemies. And so, Lysimachus, I think as I said before that
you should teach your lads these things ; and I have given
you reasons for my opinion. But I should like to hear what
additions or objections Laches has to make.

Laches. — Well, Nicias, it is hard to say of any study that
one should not letirn it. For it seems good to understand
everything. And so with regard to this sword-exercise, if it
is an art as the fencing-masters say and such as Nicias descri-
bes it, we ought to learn it; but if it be no science and its

professors be cheats, or if it be a science but not altogether a
reputable one, what is the use of learning it? Now with respect
to these points I say that had there been anything in it I think
it would not have escaped the attention of the Lacedaemonians
whose sole object in life is to find out and to practice
anything whereby they may get an advantage over others in
war. But if it has escaped their attention it has not escaped
the attention of these men who profess this art, that the
Lacedaemonians of all the Greeks take the greatest interest
in such things and that if a man gains a reputation for his
knowledge of these sciences among the Lacedaemonians he
will get the hightest pay from the other Greeks, just as the
tragic poet does who has made his reputation amongst us.
For this reason a man that thinks he can compose a tragedy
well does not go all roun4 outside of Attica and shew off in
other cities, but he comes straight to Athens and shews off
before us here. But with these fencing-masters I see that
they consider Lacedaemon to be such an unapproachable sanc-
tuary, that they do not so much as touch it with their toes, but
that they go all round about it, and that they prefer shewing off
before everybody else and especially before those who would
readily themselves confess that they have superiors in war.
VIL Then again, Lysimachus, I have met with not a few of
them in actual work, and I know what they are like. It is
quite a simple thing to consider. You know, it seems that
as though of set purpose no man that has practised sword-
exercise has ever yet earned distinction in war. And yet in
all other sciences the men who practise the science are the
ones who get a name in it. But these men, it seems, have
been far more unfortunate than the others in this respect.
For instance, this Stesileus whom you have been watching
along with us performing before so great a crowd, and
boasting of himself as he did, I once had a better look at
him from a different point of view, and I saw him in his real
colours engaged in a real performance against his will. The
ship on which he was serving was running along side of a
merchant man and he was fighting with a halbert — a different
weapon indeed, but then he was a different man. Now I
have nothing special to remark about this man in other

respects — -except only this — what was the result of his skill
in handling the hook that was on the spear For as he was
fighting it caught somehow in some of the ship's gear and
stuck fast. Stesileus therefore tugged at it to set it free, but
could not; in the meanwhile his ship was drifting past the
other. For a few minutes he ran along the ship holding fast
to the handle; but when at length the other ship was clearing
his ship and was dragging him overboard as he clung
to the spear-handle, he let it slip through his hands till he
had hold only of the spike at the other end. There then
arose laughter and derision at his strange appearance from
those on board the merchantman, and when finally some
one hurled a stone on to the deck close by his feet and
he let go the spear even the man-of-war's men were no
longer able to restrain their laughter as they saw the halbert
being waved in triumph from the merchant ship.

Perhaps, therefore, there is something in this as Nicias said;
but this is about what my experience has been.

I return therefore to what I said at first, that if it is a
science conferring such slight advantages, or if it is no
science and its professors only pretend that it is one, then it
is not worth while trying to learn it. For I think that if a
man who is a coward by nature were to think that he had
mastered this science, it would give him more foolhardiness,
and so show his true nature more clearly: whilst if a brave man
should possess it he would be watched by everybody and for
the,^ slightest error receive much disparagement. For to
fffoiess 'sCh art'lilie tlii^'iS Vn insidious thing, so that unless a
man be wonderfully superior to his fellows in manliness, he
cannot avoid ridicule if he professes to be a master of this
art. This is what I think, Lysimachus, about your interest in
this science. But I must remind you not to let Socrates off,
but to ask him to give his opinion about the subject before us.

Lysimachus. — So I do ask you, Socrates. For, you know,
our discussion still seems to need an arbitrator, whereas if
these two men had agreed in their opinions there would
have been less need of one. But now, you see, Laches
took an opposite view to Nicias — so it is fair that you should
tell us which of the two men you support.

IX. Socrates. — What, Lysimachus ? Are you going to adopt
the opinion which the majority of us recommend ?

Lysimachus. — What else can a man do, Socrates?

Socrates. — And would you too do the same, Melesias ? If
you were taking counsel about your boy's training and what
things he should practise, would you take the advice of the
majority of us, or of the man that has been trained under a
good trainer and has practised thoroughly ?

Melesias. — I should probably I suppose take the advice
of the latter.

Socrates. — -And you would rather believe him than you
would us, four though we be.

Melesias. — Probably.

Socrates. — For, I think, the coming to a good decision
depends on a practical knowledge and not on a majority.

Melesias. — Certainly.

Soceates. — Our very first enquiry then should be whether
there is any one possessing technical knowledge of the subject
that we are discussing, or not ; and if there be one we should
take his advice, single though it be, and let the others alone ;
and if there be no such man here, we must go and look for
one outside of our number. Or do you and Lysimachus think
that your controversy is about some trifling matter, whereas
it is in reality about that thing which is the greatest of all
your possessions? For you know, I suppose, that the whole
future welfare of the father's house depends upon his sons
turning out well or the reverse, as the case may be.

Melesias, — You speak the truth.

Socrates. — We should then take the deepest interest in it.

Melesias. — ("ertainly.

Socrates. — λΥεΙΙ then, suppose we were wishing to find
out which of us had the greatest technical knowledge of
wrestling, how should we set about our enquiry ? We should
take the man that has studied and practised and has been
under good instructors, should we not ?

Melesias. — Yes, I think we should.

Socrates. — But first of all, we should seek a definition of
the science for which we require teachers, should we not ?

Melesias. — How do you mean ?
X. Socrates. — Perhaps I can make my meaning more clear
in this way. I don't think we began by coming to an

agreement as to what the matter is about which we were
discussing and considering who possessed technical know-
ledge and had procured teachers with a view to getting this
knowledge, and who had not.

Nicias. — Why yes, Socrates, we were enquiring about
sword-exercise — and whether young men ought to learn
it or not, were not we ?

Socrates. — Quite so, Nicias ; but when a man enquires
about some medicine for the eyes, whether it is advisable
to use it or not, does that enquiry turn, do you think, on the
medicine or on the eyes ?

Nicias. — On the eyes.

Socrates. — And when a man considers whether he should
put a bridle to his horse, and when he should do so, he
enquires for the horse and not for the bridle ?

JSficias. — True.

Socrates. — Then to be brief, whenever a man makes an
enquiry into something for the sake of something, his
deliberation concerns itself with the thing for the sake of
which he investigated and not with the thing which he
he investigated for the sake of something else.

Nicias. — Yes, of course.

Socrates. — Well then your adviser must consider whether
his technical knowledge has any bearing upon the practice
of that thing for the sake of which we are pursuing our
investigation.

Nicias. — Of course.

Socrates. — We, say, then, that now we are considering a
branch of study for the sake of the moral nature^ of the
young men.

Nicias. — Yes.

Socrates. — And then we must enquire if by chance we can
find that some one of us is skilled in the development of the
moral nature, and has had good teachers in this.

Laches. — Stop a minute, vSocrates. Have you never yet

I. moral nature. — The Greek /jj'jf/zi? is more than "soul." It is the
seat of a man's will, desires and passions. It is also the organ
of his nous, i.e. his reason, thought and judgment.

ΙΟ

met with men who got more technical skill in some matters
\vithout teachers than with them ?

Socrates. — Yes, I have, Laches — Men whom you would
not believe if they said that they were good workmen, unless
they had one specimen or more of their workmanship to
exhibitit to you.

Laches. — That is true.
XI. Socrates. — I suppose then, Laches and Nicias, that since
Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to advise them
in their zeal to discover how the moral natures of their sons
may be best developed, we should do our best if we have any
advice to give to show them what we are and what teachers
we have had — men, in the first place, good themselves and
who have trained the moral natures of many young men, and
in the second our teachers. And if any one of us should say
that he had no teacher, then at least he should be able to
point to some of his actions, and put his hand upon some
Athenian or foreigner, bondman or free that has confessedly
been influenced through him. But it we have no such
thing to show^ we must ask them to seek for other advisers,
and not run the risk with our friends' children of spoiling
them, and so incur the greatest blame from our most inti-
mate associates. Now, Lysimachus and Melesias, I λνίΐΐ
begin by telling you that I had no teacher in the matter,
though I have been interested in it from my youth up.
I cannot afford to pay the fees of the Sophists^ who Avere the
only ones that professed to be able to make a gentleman'^ of
me, and I by myself / have been unable'^ hitherto to discover
the art. But I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches
have found it out or learned it ; for as you know, they are

1. The Sophists. — Professional teachers of wisdom, such as Protagoras

and Gorgias. Socrates had an unbounded contempt for them
and their money-making ways. This comes out more clearly in
some of his later dialogues.

2. A gentle})ian. — Greek Α^/ί?ί kai agathos. Honourable (in outward

demeanour) and good (in moral di.sposition).

3. I have been unable.— Th\z is a good instance of the well-known

mock humility of Socrates.

II

wealthier than I and can afford to learn from others, and
moreover they are older men so that they have already dis-
covered it. They seem therefore quite capable of training
a man ; for I am sure they would never be fearlessly
expressing their opinions about what pursuits were good and
bad for young men, unless they were persuaded in their own
minds that they knew the thing thoroughly;^^ Now in other
points. I trust them, but I am surprised at their differing from
one another. I shall therefore, Lysimachus, do what Laches
did just now when be begged of you not to let me go but to
question me— don't please let either Laches or Nicias off,
but question them, and say, Socrates professes not to be
familiaf with this question and to be unable to decide which
of you speaks the truth, for he has been able neither to
discover nor to learn from anyone about such things. Now
do you, Laches and Nicias, tell me each onp^of you, with
what gr^at authority on /etftbcWol^ii/.^^tiTtfers have you
associated ? and did you acquire your Knowledge by learning
from somebody or by your own investigations ? And if you
acquired it by learning, tell us who were your respective
teachers and who were your fellow-students, so that if we
should ever have-a respite from state affairs we may go to them
and persuade them either by gifts or by compliments or by both
to take the charge of our children and of yours so that they
may not bring shame upon their parents by turning out badly.
B(iit if you made such a discovery by yourselves, give us an
instance of ^ome persons whom you have taken in hand and
raised from comm• )n people to gentlemen. For if you are only
just going U) begin the work of training, I fear you will be
making Carians^ not indeed of yourselves but of your sons and
your friends,' sons, and, as the proverb says, learning pottery by
making a pot. Tell us therefore which of these advantages
and qualifications do you profess to possess? Or don't you

I. Carians. — 'en to Kari ho kindynos ' is the Greek equivalent for
the Latin ' fiat expenmentum in corpora vili '. The Carians
were despised by the GreeIvS as being the slaves of Persia. It is
very probable that this proverb," Let the danger be run in the
person of the Carian," represented the attitude of the European
Greeks during the Ionic revo't.

lay claim to any of them ? Now Lysimachus, just ask them
this and don't let the men off.
XII. Lysijiiachus. — Well, gentlemen, I think that Socrates has
spoken reasonably ; — but you must decide for yourselves,
Nicias and Laches, if you would wish to be questioned and
cross-examined on such points. Of course Melesias here
and myself would be only too glad if you would answer all
Socrates' questions in full. For,• if you remember, I began
this discussion by the remark that we were inviting you to
give us your counsel because we thought it probable that
you had given your attention to these things especially as
your boys, like our own, would very soon be old enough to
begin their education. So if you. have no objection please
join Socrates in the discussion and investigation, examining
one another and submitting to cross-examination. For
Socrates here is quite right too when he says that we are now
investigating about the greatest of nil our possessions. Please
consider whether you ought not to do so.

Nicias. — Why, Lysimachus, I really do believe that you
know Socrates only by hearsay from your father and that you
have never met him but as a child^ — perhaps when he came
to see you along with his father, amongst his fellow towns-
men, either in a temple or at some other civic gathering.
But it is quite evident that you have never met him since
he grew up.

Lysimachus. — How so, Nicias ?
XIII. Nicias. — You don't seem to me to know that whoever is
most nearly related to Socrates in argument as in family and
who comes near him in conversation is bound, whatever
subject of conversation he may have begun, Avith, not to cease
being led round and round in argument by him, till he has
been entrapped into giving a full account of his manner of
life, both now and in the past. And when he has once been
entrapped Socrates will not let him off until he has Avell and
thoroughly tested all these things. But I am accustomed to
him, and know that one must be treated like this by him,
nay more I am quite sure that I myself shall receive this
treatment. Still, Lysimachus, I am very glad to meet him,
and I do not think it is at all bad for us to be reminded of our

13

shortcomings past and present, for it follows that a man who
has not shrunk from such discipline, but who is willing to act
up to Solon's precepf^ of learning whilst we live and who does
not expect that old age will bring him wisdom, should be
more thoughtful and provident with regard to his future life.
So you see, then, that it is nothing strange or unpleasant for
rne to.be examined by Socrates — nay I was pretty sure a long
time ago that if Socrates were present we should hot talk
about the youngsters but about ourselves. I repeat then
that as far as I am concerned there is no reason why Socrates
should not conduct the argument as he likes. But see what
Laches thinks about it.

. Laches. — Well, Nicias, as far as reasonings are concerned
I am a very siniple-minde(;i man. Or rather, perhaps, I am
not simple but ooubte. ' For in a way I seem to be a lover
of arguments and again a hater of them, For when I hear
a man talking of virtue or any other branch of wisdom — one
who is a man indeed and worthy of the words he speaks — I
am exceedingly delighted beause I see that both speaker and
words are qonsistent and suited to one another. A man of
this sort seems to me to be in every way a musician, and to
be attuned to the best of harmonies, not that of a lyre or
childish instrument, but to be attuned to the real living of a life
in WTiich his actions are consistent with his words — a true Doric
mode — not Ionian, nor I think Phrygian or Lydian, but the
only true Greek harmony. A man of this sort then makes
me rejoice when he speaks and then any one would take me
for a lover of words, so strongly do I acquiesce in what is
said. But the man whose actions are inconsistent grieves
me, and the better he seems to me to speak the more he
grieves me, and then you would take me for a hater of words.
Now, as to Socrates, I have no acquaintance with his argu-
ments, but, it seems, I have had some previous experience
of his actions, and in these I found him to be a man worthy
of high wOrds and of every freedom of speech. If this be the
case then my good wishes go with him, and I shall have no

I. Solon'' s precept. — ' gerasko d' aiei polla didaskonienos '. " I grow
old ever learning many things.

14

objection to learning ; indeed I agree with what Solon says

~~ making one addition thereto. For as I grow old I want

to learn many things but only from good men. For you

must allow me this that my teacher himself must be a good

man, else my dislike for learning may be construed as dullness.

f- a i(r) But I don't care in the least about his being a young man

or not yet famous, or any such thing. I exhort you therefore

ν Socrates to teach me and examine me as much as you like,

and in your turn to learn from me what I know. These

have been my sentiments towards you ever since that day on

which you stood by my side in danger and gave in your own

person a proof of valour such as one who intends to give

justly should give. Say then what you yourself like and don't

trouble yourself about my age, (i.e. speak without restraint).

Λδζ! Socrates. — It seems that I shall not be able to find fault

with you for being unready to join in counsel and investigation.

Lysimachus. — We had better get to work then Socrates —
you see I reckon you as one of us — ; so please consider on
behalf of the youngsters what information we require from
these men, and advise with them. For my age makes me
very often forget what I had intended to ask and again what
replies I get ; and if another subject comes up in between I
can't remember at all. Will you then speak and argue with
one another on the subject we proposed ? And I will listen
and then will do with Melesias whatever you decide.

Socrates. — Nicias and Laches, we must obey Lysimachus
and Melesias. To begin then with our queries — who were
our teachers in this branch of education, or whom have we
improved — perhaps it will not be bad for us to examine
ourselves even on such points. But I think that the method
which I am going to suggest will bring us to the same point,
nay that it is even more fundamental. For if it happens
that we know about anything, that, by being added to anything
else, it improves that to \vhich it is added, and if further we
be able so to add it to the other thing, then it is evident
that we also know that about which we should take counsel,
namely how a man could most easily and best obtain it.
But perhaps you don't understand my meaning, so I will
put it for you in this way. If we know that sight added to

15

eyes makes the eyes to which it is added better, and further
if we are able to add sight to the eyes, it is evident that we
know the nature of sight — about which we might enquire
how a man might obtain it most easily and best. Whereas
if we did not even know the nature of sight or of hearing we
should scarcely be advisers worth listening to or speciaUsts
for the eyes or ears, capable of showing how best to obtain
hearing or sight.

Laches. — You speak the truth, Socrates.
• Socrates. — Well then. Laches, these two men have
invited us (have^they not)? to take counsel as to the manner
in which virtue may be added to their sons so as to make
their souls better.

Laches. — Yes, to be sure.

Socrates. — This presupposes then, does it not ? that we
know what virtue is. For if we have no notion about the
nature of virtue, how can we advise a man as to the way in
which he can best obtain it.

Laches. — -We could not advise him, I think.

Socrates. — We profess then, Laches, to understand what
it is.

Laches. — To be sure.

Socrates. — Then if we know it, I suppose we can define it.

Laches. — Yes.

Socrates. — Now, my dear sir, let us not straightway invest-
igate about virtue as a whole — for that would be rather a
long business ; — but let us first take some part of it, and see
if we are sufficiently equipped as to knowledge of it. Thus,
methinks, our investigation will be the easier.

Laches. — We will do as you wish, Socrates.

Socrates. — Now, which of the parts of virtue shall we
prefer ? I suppose it must be that to which the science of
arms evidently tends. And I suppose most men will agree
that that is manliness. Is it not?

Loaches. — I certainly think so.

Soci-ates. — Let us begin then, Laches, by trying to define
manliness. Then we will consider how it can be developed
in young men — so far as that is possible by practising and
learning. Please then try as I say, to define manliness.

ή'

i6

XVII. Laches. — By Zeus, Socrates, that is not difficult to define.
You Ιίηολν, when a man voluntarily remains in the ranks
under an attack from the enemy and does not retreat he is a
brave man. You may be sure of that.

Socrates. — You spoke well, Laches ; but — I suppose itAvas
my fault for not speaking clearly that you did not give an
answer to my question but to some quite different question.

Laches. — How do you mean, Socrates ?
/ (P•) Socrates. — I will tell you if I can. We both of us agree
I believe that the man who remains in the ranks fighting the
enemy is a brave man.

Laches. — That is what I say.

Socrates. — So do I. But what of the man who fights as
he retreats, but does not hold his position ?

Laches. — How do you mean "as he retreats ? "

Socrates. — As I believe the Scythians are said to fight as
much when retreating as when advancing, and as LLomer^
praises the horses of Aeneas " swift hither and thither, Avell
skilled in pursuit and flight." And in the same λvay he
praises Aeneas for his knowledge of fear and calls him the
"causer of fear."

Laches, — Quite right too, Socrates. You know, he was
speaking of chariots. And you are talking about Scythian
cavalry, and this, as you know, is their method of cavalry
warfare. But infantry tactics are the true Greek method
as I say.

Socrates. — I suppose. Laches, you would except the Laced-
aemonians. You know, they say that at Plataea when the
Lacedccmonians had to fight the Persian light infantry they
purpo.sely did not maintain their positions but retreated, and
when the Persian ranks got broken they turned back like
cavalry men and attacked them, and that thus they gained
that victory.

Laches. — You are quite right.
>CVIII. Socrates. — This then was what I meant when I said that
my bad way of putting the question was the cause of your
not answering properly. For I wished to learn from you not

I. Homer. — Iliad VIII. 105.

17

only about those who are brave in infantry tactics but in cavalry
tactics also and in every kind of warfare, and not the brave
in war only, but those too who are brave in maritime dangers,
and those who are brave in enduring sickness or poverty or
even in political conjunctures, and again, not only those that
are brr.ve in enduring pains or fears, but those too that are
skilled in fighting against desires or pleasures, both "by
holding their ground and by returning to the attack " — for
I suppose, Laches, that there are some people who are brave
in these ways.

Laches. — Most certainly there are, Socrates.

Socrates. — All of these then are brave, are they not? but some
possess bravery in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires,
others in fears, others I think possess cowardice in these
same things.

Laches.- — -Certainly.

Socrates. — Now I asked for a definition of each of them
(bravery and cowardice). So please try again, and, first with
regard to bravery, tell me what quality there is Avhich is
common to all these instances. Or do you not yet grasp my
meaning ?

Laches. — Not quite.
IX. Socrates. — Well, I will put it thus. Supposing I were
asking for a definition of swiftness, it would be that which
is common for us in running, in playing the cithara, in
learning and many other actions, and which we possess the
same, as far as we can venture to say, either in the actions
of hands or legs, or of the tongue, the voice, or the intellect.
Don't you agree with me ?

Laches. — Certainly.

Socrates. — If then some one should ask me, — ' Socrates,
what do you call this common quality of swiftness in all of
these?' I should say that I call swiftness the power of doing
many things in a short space of time, whether it be with the
voice, or in running, or in anything else.

Laches. — And you Avould be quite right too.

Socrates. — Now, Laches, will you try to define bravery in
this way ? What power is it, exhibited alike in pleasure and
pain and in all the other circumstances that we just now
mentioned, which is called "bravery"?

i8

Laches. — Well then if I must define its nature in general
terms, I think that bravery is a kind of endurance of the soul.

Socrates. — WeH we must agree with you if we are to
answer our question. But this is how it seems to me.
I don't think that all endurance is bravery. And this is how
I form my opinion. I am nearly certain, Laches, that you
consider mnnliness to be one of the noble qualities.

Laches. — Indeed one of the very noblest.

Socrates. — You mean I suppose that endurance coupled
with prudence is noble and good.

Laches. — Of course.

Socrates. — And what of endurance coupled with folly ?
Is it not then quite the opposite — evil in its effects and
injurious ?

Laches. — Yes.

Socrates. — Would you say then that anything like that,
injurious in its effects and hurtful, is noble ?

Laches.^ — It would not be right to do so, Socrates.

Socrates. — Endurance of this kind, then, you would not
call manliness, inasmuch as it is not noble, whereas man-
liness is.

Laches. — You are right.

Socrates. — Then, according to your definition, endurance
witli prudence is bravery.

Laches. — So it seems.
XX. Socrates. — Let us see then. AVhat does this prudence
concern itself with ? Is it prudence as concerns everything
both small and great? For instance, if a man exhibits
endurance in spending money wisely because he knows that
by so spending it he will presently gain more, — would you
call him brave?

Laches. — No, by Zeus, I should not.

Socrates. — Or if a man were a doctor and his child or some
one else's were down with inflammation of the lungs and
begged him to give him something to eat or to drink, and he
were to obstinately'^ refuse to give any ?

Loaches. — This would not be bravery either.

I. obstinately. — The Greek word here means "to endure," but it is
impossible to reproduce the word-play in English.

19

Socrates. — Again, a man of endurance in war and willing
to fight, and thoughtfully considering — knowing that there
will be reinforcements to aid him, and that the enemy with
whom he is going to fight are fewer and weaker than his own
side, and moreover that he has the advantage of position —
when a man after these considerations and with these prepar-
ations shows bravery, would you call him more courageous,
or the man who, in the opposing army, should be willing to
maintain his position and show endurance ?

Laches. — I should say that the man in the opposing army
would show the greater courage.

Socrates. — And yet his courage is more imprudent than
the other man's.

Laches. — Quite so.

Socrates. — Then I suppose you will say that the man
skilled in horsemanship will evince less courage in a cavalry
engagement than the man who has no such skill.

Laches. — I think so.

Socrates. — And so too of the man whose endurance is
coupled with a knowledge of the use of the sling or bow, or any
such art.

Laches. — Yes.

Socrates. — And when men are willing to go down into a
well, or to dive, and to show endurance in this work, without
having any particular skill therein, or in any singular work, —
you would call them braver than the men who are thus
proficient.

Laches. — How could one help doing so, Socrates ?

Socrates. — If one thought so, one would have to say so.

Laches. — Well, that is what I think.

Socrates. — And yet, I suppose, men of this sort are more
imprudent in the risks they run and in the endurance they
exhibit than those whose endurance is coupled with skill.

Laches. — So it seems.

Socrates. — But we saw a few minutes ago that thoughtless
boldness and endurance was disgraceful and injurious.

Laches. — Yes, we did.

Socrates. — And we agreed that manliness was something
noble.

Laches. — So we did.

Socrates. — And now on the other hand we say that that
disgraceful thing — thoughtless endurance — is manliness.

Laches. — It appears so.

Socrates. — Do you think then that we are arguing well ?

Laches. — No, by Zeus, Socrates, I don't.
XXI. Socrates. — I suppose then that according to your expression
we have not been attuned, you and I, to any Doric measure,
Laches. For our facts do not agree with our reasons. For
as it seems, one might say thatVe had got hold of courage
in fact, but that to judge from our present conversation, we.
have not got it with our reason.

Laches. — That is most true.

Socrates. — Well, then, do you Lhink that is a satisfactory
condition for us to be in ?

Laches. — By no means.

Socrates. — Are you willing then to acquiesce in what we
are saying, up to this point ?

Laches. — What are we to acquiesce in, and up to what point?

Socrates. — The reasoning which bids us endure. If you
wish it then let us remain firm and constant in our enquiries,
so that our manliness may not be open to ridicule for not
seeking it bravely, if it be true that very often steadfastness
itself is courage.

Laches.- — I am quite ready, Socrates, to pursue till we get
what we want. And yet I am not accustomed to such
enquiries, but a kind of contentiousness towards what has been
spoken has arisen in me, and I am truly grieved that I cannot
say things just as I think them For I think that I have a
conception about courage, but scmehow it has escaped from
me, so that I cannot catch it with a definition and tell it.

Socrates. — My dear fellow, — r good huntsman has to follow
on with his dogs and not relax.

Laches. — That is perfectly certain.
XXII. Socrates. — What do you say then to inviting Nicias here
to join us in the chase? It may be that he is a man of more
resources than we are.

Laches. — Why, of course, I shall be delighted.

Socrates. — Come now, Nicias, come and help your friends
whose arguments are tempest-tost and who are themselves
in distress.

You can sec what a difficulty we are in. So please tell us
what you think manliness to be, and by so doing get us out
of our difficulty and confirm your own opinions by arguments.

JVicias.l have been thinking for some time that you were
not defining manliness properly. You know I have heard
you give a very good definition of it, but you do not use it now.

Socrates. — What was that ?

Nicias. — I have often heard you say that a man is good
where he is wise and that where he is ignorant there he is bad.

Socrates. — That is quite so, Nicias.

Nicias, — Well then, if the brave man is good, it is evident
that he is wise.

Socrates. — Did you hear that, Laches ?

Laches. — I did and I don't fully understand his meaning.

Socrates. — I think however that I understand it, and I
think that Nicias is defining bravery as a kind of wisdom.

Laches. — What kind of wisdom, Socrates ?

Socrates. — You had better ask him.

Loaches. — So I will.

Socrates. — Come now, Nicias, tell him — what branch of
wisdom is bravery ? I suppose it isn't flute playing.

Laches. — Not quite.

Socrates. — Nor yet playing on the cithara.

Laches. — Of course not.

Socrates. — Then what science is it, and with what does it
concern itself? ,v^

Laches. — I am glad you have asked him tha,t question, let
him tell us what science he says it is, -«-«•-«••-«< έ λ*-*-•-' "- f i^ *^

Nicias. — So I will, Laches. It is the science of the things
which inspire fear and confidence both in war and in all
other things.

Laches. — What an absurd definition, Socrates !

Soctates. — What makes you say that. Laches?

Laches. — Why, surely, wisdom is distinct from courage.

Socrates. — Nicias says it is not.

Laches. — By Jove, though — that's all nonsense.

Socrates. — Let's teach him better, then, but don't let's
abuse him.

Nicias. — No don't abuse me. You know, Socrates, I

•^uM

to prove me to be ca

think that Laches is anxious to prove me to be talking
rubbish because he has just been talkiug such rubbish
himself.
XXIII. Laches. — Exactly so, Nicias, and I am going to prove my
point, for you are talking nonsense. For, to begin with, in
epidemics do not physicians know all about the grounds of
fear ? or do you think that the brave ones understand ? or
do you call the physicians brave ?

Nicias. — Not at all.

Laches. — No more than you call farmers brave, I think.
And yet these men I suppose understand the risks connected
with farming and in all other handicrafts men know the risks
and encouragements of their own arts. But that does not
make them any the more courageous.

Socrates. — What do you think of Laches' notion, Nicias ?
I think he is speaking to the point.

Nicias. — It is to the point I know, but it is not true.

Socrates. — Ηολν so ?

Nicias. — Because he thinks that physicians know something
more about their patients than simply the condition of their
health. Whereas that is the only thing they know : — but
whether sickness rather than health is a terrible thing or not for
anyone, do you think. Laches, that the physicians understand
that ? Or don't you think that for many people it is better
not to recover than to recover ? Tell me this, pray. Do you
say that Hfe is better for all men, and not that death is
preferable for many ?

Laches. — That's what I think.

Nicias. — Do you think then that the same things are
terrible to those for whom death is preferable, and those for
whom life ?

Laches. — Not I.

Nicias. — But do you grant that physicians or any other
workmen except the man whg is versed in what is terrible
and not terrible, that is the man whom I call brave, — knows
these things.

Socrates. — Do you understand what he means. Laches ?

Laches. — Yes, I take it he calls prophets brave men. For
who but a prophet should know who had better live or die ?

By the bye, Nicias, do you profess to be a prophet yourself,
or are you neither a prophet nor brave ?

Nicias. — Hallo ! Do you think now that it needs a prophet
to distinguish objects of fear and of confidence ?

Laches. — Yes I do. Who else could do it ?
XXIV. Nicias. — The man that I am describing could do it far
better. A prophet, you know, need only know the signs of
coming events, if a man is going to meet with death or disease
or loss of property or victory or defeat either in war or in
any other matter. But as to who had better meet with such
and such accidents, how can that be the province of a prophet
to decide more than of any other person?

Laches. — I can't understand what he means, Socrates.
He does not make it clear who is the brave man — neither
physician, prophet nor anyone else, unless haply it be some
god. Now it seems to me that Nicias does not wish to own
in a straightforward manner that he is talking rubbish ; but -/_
he is twisting and turning about to conceal his own perplexity.^^'''^r'^
And yet you and I might just now have twisted and turned
about like this ourselves had we wished to avoid seeming to
flagrantly contradict ourselves. Such a method of arguing
would be all very well in a law-court, but now in a gathering
like ours why should any one trick himself out with these
idle tricks of argument ?

Socrates. — Why indeed ? I quite agree with you. Laches.
But perhaps Nicias is of the opinion that he is saying
something and not merely talking for the sake of talking.
So let us ask him to tell us more distinctly what he means,
and if he says anything correctly we will agree with him — if
not, we will instruct him.

Laches. — Ask on, Socrates, if you wish. I think that I
have heard enough.

Socrates. — Well, I have nothing to hinder me. You know,
I shall ask for us both.

Laches. — Certainly.
XXV. Socrates. — Tell me then, Nicias, or rather tell us, for we
share the discussion, Laches and I, — do you define courage
as a knowledge of the grounds of fear and of confidence ?

Nicias. — Yes I do.

24

Socrates. — And you would say, I suppose, that it is not
every man that knows it, seeing that neither physician nor
prophet can know it, nor be brave — unless in addition to his
professional skill he also possess this knowledge ? Was not
that what you said ?

Nicias. — It was.

Socrates. — If we may use the proverb then, it is not every
son that knows, or that becomes manly.

Nicias. — I think not.

Socrates. — It is evident, Nicias, that you do not even think
the Crommyonian^ boar was brave. And this I say not as a
joke but because I think it is necessary for the man who
uses this definition not to expect courage in any animal, or
else he must admit that there are some animals so wise that
what few men know on account of the difficulty of it \ve must
admit that a lion or a leopard or even a goat may know.
But it is necessary that a man who defines bravery as you
have done should admit that a lion, a stag, a bull, and an
ape are equally capable of manliness.

Laches. — By the Gods you speak well, Socrates ; and now
answer us truly. Which is it? Do you say that these animals,
which we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than us, or are
you going to fly in the face of universal opinion and deny
that they are even courageous ?

Nicias. — I am not going, you know, to apply the term
" brave " either to animals or to anything else that is devoid
of fear on account of ignorance, but is fearless and foolish.
Or do you want me to call " brave " all children who fear
nothing on account of their ignorance ? To be devoid of
fear and to be courageous are not the same thing. And I
think that only very few people partake of bravery and fore-
thought, whilst many — men, women, children and beasts —
possess audacity, daring and fearlessness Avith want of
forethought. So, what you and most people call courageous,
I call bold, and the courageous ones are the prudent ones
of whom I speak.

I. the Crommyonian boar. — A fabulous beast, said to have been killed
by Theseus.

25

XVI. Laches. — Observe, Socrates, how' -well he tricks himself
out with words, as he imagines ? Those beings whom all
men confess to be brave, he is trying to deprive of their
character. .\ .

Nicias. — Not so, Laches, put yourself at your ease. ;-I'say
that you are a wise man, and so is Lamachus^ (if, that is, you
are brave) and so are many other Athenians.

Laches. — I won't make any objections to this, though I
might — but I don't want you to say that I am a real Aixonean."'

Socrates. — Please dont, Laches; — I don't think, you know,
that 3OU have the slightest notion that Nicias has got this
v/isdom from our friend Damon. And Damon is very
intimate with Prodicus, who, as you know, is famous among
Sophists for the beautiful distinctions he draws between such
words.

Laches. — Yes, and it is more fitting for a sophist to -deal
with such quibbles than for a man whom the State deems
worthy of the chief magistracy. ' "

Socrates. — 'R:<itlie.i; it is fitting that he whcv presides over
the greatest interests should be a possessor of the greatest
wisdom. And I think that it is quite right that Nicias should
investigate how and on what grotinds he defines courage.

Laches. — Won't you do it yourself, Socrates?

Socrates. — I am going to do so, my dear fellow ; but dont
imagine that I am going to release you from your share of
the enquiry ; but give me your attention and join me in the
investigation.

Laches. — Very well, ^f you think I ought to do so.

Socrates.— Λ think' you ought. Now Nicias let us start
afresh. Do you remember that we began by considering
courage as a part of virtue ?

Nicias. — We did. ' ■

Socrates. — And that your answers were given as concerning

I Lamachus, — was Nitins' collengue in the .Sicilian expedilion. TTie
two commanders did not get on very well together.

2. Aixomans — (Aixbne was a ward of Athens) Vv'crc noted for. flieir
l)ad language. Cf. the English expression " Billingsgate."

26

a part, — with many other parts — all of which together are
designated virtue ?

Nicias. — Yes.

Socrates — Now, do you agree with me in this? You know
I say that, besides courage, prudence and righteousness and
the like are virtues. Don't you ?

Nicias. — Of course.

Socrates. — So far so good, we agree on this. Now let us
see if you and we agree about grounds of fear and confidence.
We will first tell you what we think them to be ; and if
you don't agree with us you must teach us. Now we think
that grounds of fear are those things which cause fear: and it
is not past evils nor present that cause fear but evils
anticipated ; for fear is an anticipation of future evil. Don't
you agree with me, Laches ?

ΖβίΛ^ί•.— Entirely.

Socrates. — Now, Nicias, you have our view namely, that
grounds of fear are future evils, and grounds of confidence
are things which are not evil, or that are good, in the future.
Would you give the same definition ?

Nicias. — I should.

Socrates. — Would you then say that the understanding of
those things was courage ?

Nicias. — f ,'ertai η ly .
XXVIII. Socrates. — Now let us see if you agree with us on a third
point.

Nicias. — What is it ?

Socrates. — I will tell you. Laches and I think that wher-
ever there is knowledge it does not differ as to how past
things have occurred or present things occur, nor yet about
how that which has not yet come to pass might and will best
come to pass, but that it is the same. For instance with
regard to the preservation of health through all the ages of
man, it is the science of medicine alone and as a whole which
considers the past and present and how the future shall come
to pass. And again with regard to what grows out of the
earth it is agriculture that considers it. And, with matters of
war, I am sure that you would bear me witness yourselves
that the science of strategy is the one that takes the

27

best precautions especially for future contingencies, and that
it ought not to be subservient to but to, rule, the art of
soothsaying, because it has more knowledge of military affairs
both present and future. And thus the law orders not that
the soothsayer shall command the general, but the general the
soothsayer. Shall we say this, Laches ?

hac/ies. — Yes.

Socrates. — Again, — do you agree with me, Nicias, that the
same science deals with the same facts both future, present
and past ?

Nicias. — Yes, that is what I think, Socrates.

Socrates. — Then you say, courage is the science of grounds
of fear and confidence. Is it not ?

Nicias. — Yes.

Socrates. — And we agreed that grounds of fear and confi-
dence were respectively evil things and good in the furure.

Nicias. — We did.

Socrates. — And the same science deals with them both in
the future and in every aspect.

Nicias. — It does.

Socrates. — Courage then is not only a knowledge of grounds
of fear and confidence. For it treats of good things and
evil not only as future, but also as present, and past, and in
every other aspect, as do also the other sciences.

Nicias. — So it seems.
XXIX. Socrates. — We have then, as it seems from your answer,
Nicias, a third subdivision of courage. And yet we asked
for a definition of courage as a whole. But now it would
seem from your account that courage is not only the science
of grounds of fear and confidence, but we might almost say
that, as you show it, courage is the science of all good and
evil things in every aspect. May we transpose it in this way,
or how would you say it, Nicias ?

Nicias. — I think we may.

Socrates. — Now, my good sir, do you think that a man
like this would in any way fall short of virtue, if he knew all
good things and in every aspect, how they come, came, and
will come to pass, and the same of things that are evil ? And
do you imagine that a man like this would be wanting in

prudence, or righteousnees or holiness, seeing that he alone
is permitted, both with regard to gods and men, to give cautions
about what are grounds of fear or not, and to furnish what
is good since he understands how rightly to associate with it.

Nicias. — I think there is something in what you say,
Socrates.

Socrates. ^^\\•2Λ. you just now described, then, is not as you
said a part of virtue, but virtue in its entirety.

Nicias. — So it is.

Socrates. — And yet we said that courage was one of the
parts of virtue.

Nicias. — So we did.

Socrates. — But what we were just now describing did not
seem to be so.

Nicias. — No it did not.

Socrates. — Then, it would seem, we have not yet found a
definition of manliness.

Nicias. — It seems not.

Laches. — And yet, my dear Xicias, I thought you would
find it out, because you were so contemptuous over the
ans^vers I gave to Socrates. So I had really very great
expectations that the wisdom you had learned from Damon
\vould help you find out.
XXX. Nicias. — I afn' glad to think. Laches, that you don't think
much of being proved to talk nonsense yourself, and that
when I am proved to be noAviserthan yourself you remember
it, and are going to make no diflfierence between yourself
and me in respect to our knowing nothing of what a
man Λvith a good opinion of himself ought to know. Now
you, methinks, are doing a very human action in looking not
at yourself but at others ; but I think that I spoke reasonably
enough about 'what we Λvere discussing ; .and if I have not
spoken quite up to the mark' in anything I will correct it
later on with the aid of Damon, whom you seem to laugh at
though you never saw him, and of others. And when I have
proved my point I will teach you — Avithout stint — for you
seem to me to be very anxious to learn.

Laches. — You are a very wise man, Nicias, and yet I advise
Lysimachus here and Melesias not to trouble about your

29

opinion and mine with respect to the education of these
youngsters, but to keep hold of Socrates here, as I said at
first. And if my boys were of that age I should be doing
the same.

Nicias. — I agree with you that if Socrates is willing to take
charge of the lads, they need not look for any one else.
And I should be very glad to entrust my Niceratus to him
if he would take him. But, unfortunately, whenever I men-
tion the subject to him he recommends some one else and
won't undertake it himself. But it may be, Lysimachus, that
Socrates will be more complaisant to you.

Lysimachus. — It would be but fair, Nicias, for I should be
very glad to do many things for him which I would not do
for many other people. What do you say Socrates? Will
you accede to our request, and help us in making these lads
as good as possible ?

. Socrates.— \<l\\y., it would be a terrible thing, Lysimachus, to
refuse help in such a cause. If then our conversation just
now has shown me to know anything, which these two men
did not know, it would be quite right to invite me to this
work. I But — you know we all alike got into difficulties — why
should one prefer any one of us.? I think that none of us
should be preferred. But since these things are so, consider
if I seem to give you any good advice. For I say, gentlemen
— and this is between ourselves^ — that we ought all to find
for ourselves a teacher^ — the best we can .find, for we want
one, — and then one for the lads, sparing neither expense
nor trouble. But I don'^t advise leaving ourselves as we are.
And should anyone laugh at us for going to school at our
time of life, we can have recourse to Horner^ — who said that
" shame was a bad companion for a man of experience."
So let us not trouble ourselves about our own opinions, but
let us take common actions for ourselves and the lads.

lysimachus. — I am quite satisfied with what you say,
Socrates, and as I am the oldest so am I the most eager to
learn with the young ones. So please do me this favor.
Come to-morrow morning early to my house, without fail, in

I. Homer.— OA. XIV. 347.

30

order that we may discuss these matters. For^he present
we must break up our party.

Socrates. — I will do so, Lysimachus, and, God willing, I
will come to your house to-morrow.

THE END.

PRESS OF W. WILLIAMSON, PORT HOPE.

V: